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Abstract
Zhu (2003) shows existence of full-support monetary steady states
with strictly concave value functions in a random matching model
with individual money holdings in {0, 1, 2, ..., B} for a general B. He
also shows that corresponding to each such steady state is an l-replica
steady state for each l ∈ N: money is traded in bundles of l units, the
support is {0, l, 2l, ..., lB}, and the value function is a step-function
with jumps at points of the support. We show that such l-replicas
are unstable if the underlying full-support steady state is a pure strat-
egy steady state and if the support of the initial distribution is not
{0, l, 2l, ..., lB}.
(JEL classification: C62, C78, E40)
Keywords: random matching model; monetary steady state; instabil-
ity; Zhu (2003).
1 Introduction
Shi (1995) and Trejos-Wright (1995) study a matching model of fiat money
with individual money holdings in the set {0, 1}. Such holdings are special
∗Korea University: pidonghuang@korea.ac.kr
†University of Exeter: y.y.igarashi@exeter.ac.uk
‡The authors are especially grateful to Neil Wallace for his guidance and encourage-
ment. We also thank Daniella Puzzello, Ed Green, Ricardo Cavalcanti, Rulin Zhou, the
editor and two anonymous referees, and the participants in the Cornell-Penn State macro
workshop for their helpful comments and discussions. The title of the working paper
version of this article was “Why Ten $1’s Are Not Treated as a $10.”
1
because the distribution of holdings is determined by the stock of money; that
is, it is unaffected by the trades that are made. That property disappears
for any richer set of individual money holdings. For buyer take-it-or-leave-it
offers, Zhu (2003) studies the model with individual money holdings in the
set {0,∆, 2∆, ..., B∆}, for arbitrary B. He provides sufficient conditions for
the existence of a steady state with a full-support money-holding distribution
and a strictly increasing and strictly concave value function, a steady state
that we call a Zhu steady state.
In Zhu’s model, there are three exogenous nominal quantities: (∆, B∆,m),
where m is the per capita stock of money. If, for some positive integer
l ≥ 2, we compare that economy to an otherwise identical economy with
nominal quantities (l∆, lB∆, lm), then we have neutrality. But what if we
compare (∆, B∆,m) to (∆, lB∆, lm)? Zhu shows that any steady state
for (∆, B∆,m) is also a steady state for (∆, lB∆, lm), one in which all
owned/traded quantities of money are multiplied by l and the value func-
tion is a step function with steps at and only at integer multiples of an
l-bundle. We call such a non-full-support steady state an l-replica. In an
l-replica with l = 10, for example, ten $1’s are treated only as a bundle;
that is, as a $10.1 Such a steady state implies a lower real balance of money
and, almost certainly, lower welfare than in the full-support steady state of
(∆, lB∆, lm).
The presence of l-replicas complicates the use of the model for policy
analysis unless there are reasons to ignore them. Wallace and Zhu (2004)
show that such replicas are not robust to the introduction of a small utility
of holding money. Here we show something even stronger; if l-replicas are
constructed from a Zhu steady state that is supported by pure strategies,
then they are not stable. Specifically, if the initial distribution has support
different from {0, l∆, 2l∆, ..., Bl∆}, then there is no equilibrium that con-
verges to such l-replicas.
Zhu steady states can either be pure-strategy steady states or mixed
strategy steady states and, as just noted, our instability result applies only to
l-replicas that are constructed from pure-strategy steady states.2 It remains
an open question whether the result extends to l-replicas that are constructed
from mixed-strategy steady states.
1The present paper is not about denomination of a currency. In particular, in Zhu’s
model a $10 is nothing but 10 $1’s because there is no carrying cost of money.
2See [4] for a demonstration that both kinds are generic. For any B, a pure-strategy
Zhu steady state exists for a sufficiently high β. See Camera and Corbae (1999).
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One reason to study the Zhu (2003) model is that it has policy implica-
tions that differ from those of the model with money holdings in {0, 1} and
from models with degenerate distributions of money holdings. In particular,
as discussed in Wallace (2014) and shown by Molico (2006) and Deviatov
(2006), moderate inflation improves welfare through re-distributional effects
in versions of the Zhu model. That cannot happen in models with money
holdings in {0, 1} or in models with degenerate distributions of money hold-
ings.
2 Model
The model is that in Zhu (2003). Time is discrete, dated as t ≥ 0. There is
a non-atomic unit measure of infinitely-lived agents. There is a consumption
good that is perfectly divisible and perishable. Each agent maximizes the
expected discounted utility with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Utility in a period
is u(c)− q, where c ∈ R+ is the amount of good consumed and q ∈ R+ is the
amount of good produced. u : R+ → R is continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave, and satisfies u(0) = 0 and u′(∞) = 0. In
addition, u′(0) is sufficiently large but finite.
There is a fixed stock of intrinsically useless money that is indivisible and
perfectly durable. Because of the neutrality we discussed in the previous
section, the size of the smallest unit of money is normalized to one. Two
other exogenous quantities are (B,m), where B is the maximum units that
an agent can hold, and m ∈ (0, B) is the fixed per capita stock of money. We
denote the set of possible individual money holdings by B = {0, 1, · · · , B}.
The state of the economy at each date is a distribution over B, which for
each k ∈ B gives the fraction of agents who have k units of money.
In each period, agents are randomly matched in pairs. With probability
1/N , where N ≥ 2, an agent is a consumer (producer) and the partner is
a producer (consumer). Such meetings are called single-coincidence meet-
ings. With probability 1− 2/N , the match is a no-coincidence meeting.3 In
meetings, agents’ money holdings are observable, but any other information
about an agent’s trading history is private.
In a single-coincidence meeting between a consumer with i units of money
3One foundation is that there are N types of agents and N types of consumption goods,
that type-n agents can produce type-n goods only and consume type-(n+ 1) goods only,
and that the money is symmetrically distributed across the types.
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and a producer with j units of money, an (i, j)-meeting, the consumer makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer consisting of the amount to be produced, q, and
the amount of money to be paid, p. The offer must be feasible, 0 ≤ p ≤
min{i, B−j}, and must satisfy the producer’s participation constraint, −q+
βwt+1j+p ≥ βwt+1j , where wtk is the expected discounted value of holding k ∈ B
units of money, prior to date-t matching. Because the optimal offer leaves no
positive gain to the producer, the consumer’s problem reduces to choosing p
in the feasible set of offers of money
pt(i, j, wt+1) = argmax
0≤p≤min{i,B−j}
{u (βwt+1j+p − βwt+1j )+ βwt+1i−p}. (1)
Because pt(i, j, wt+1) is discrete and may be multi-valued, randomization over
the elements of pt(i, j, wt+1) is allowed. Let λt(p; i, j) be the probability that
consumers with i (pre-trade) in meetings with producers with j offer p at
date t. It has support in pt(i, j, wt+1) in equilibrium, so that∑
p∈pt(i,j,wt+1)
λt(p; i, j) = 1. (2)
Let pitk denote the fraction of agents holding k units of money prior to
date-t matching. The law of motion is
pit+1k = pi
t
k +
1
N
∑
{i,j|i>k}
pitipi
t
jλ
t(i− k; i, j) (3)
+
1
N
∑
{i,j|j<k}
pitipi
t
jλ
t(k − j; i, j)
− 1
N
∑
j
pitkpi
t
j
∑
p>0
λt(p; k, j)
− 1
N
∑
i
pitipi
t
k
∑
p>0
λt(p; i, k).
The Bellman equation is
wti =
N − 1
N
βwt+1i +
1
N
B∑
j=0
pitj
∑
p
λt(p; i, j)
{
u
(
βwt+1j+p − βwt+1j
)
+ βwt+1i−p
}
.
(4)
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The first term on the r.h.s. corresponds to entering a no-coincidence meeting
or becoming a producer who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
the offer. Free disposal of money is permitted which implies that the value
function must be nondecreasing in every period:
wti ≥ wti−1, for i = 1, · · ·B, and wt0 = 0. (5)
Given (5), we focus on equilibria in which agents do not dispose of money.
Definition 1 Given pi0, an equilibrium is a sequence {(λt, pit, wt)}∞t=0 that
satisfies (1)-(5). A monetary steady state is (λ, pi, w) with w 6= 0 such that
(λt, pit, wt) = (λ, pi, w) for all t is an equilibrium. Pure-strategy steady states
are those for which (1) has a unique solution for all meetings. Other steady
states are called mixed-strategy steady states.4 A Zhu steady state is a steady
state for which pi has a full support and w is strictly increasing and strictly
concave.5
Our definition of steady states differs from that in Zhu only in that we
explicitly include λ, a description of trades. In a non-full support steady
state, some meetings occur with zero probability. Our definition requires a
definition of trades for all meetings, including those which occur with zero
probability. That is because such meetings will in general occur with positive
probability near a steady state.
Next, we formally define l-replicas for economies in which the smallest
unit of money is one.
Definition 2 Let s = (λˆ, pˆi, wˆ) be a Zhu steady state of economy (B,m).
For integer l ≥ 2, an l-replica of s, denoted s(l) = (λ∗, pi∗, w∗), is a steady
state of economy (lB, lm) that satisfies
pi∗il = pˆii, and pi
∗
il+i′ = 0, ∀i′ ∈ L, (6)
w∗il = wˆi, and w
∗
il+i′ = w
∗
il, ∀i′ ∈ L, (7)
where L ≡ {1, · · · , l − 1}.
4Note that in this definition, the ‘boundary’ situations in which (1) has more than
one solution but in which the randomization is degenerate are included in mixed-strategy
equilibria. Such situations are non-generic.
5Zhu (2003) gives sufficient conditions for the existence of such steady states.
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When we discuss an l-replica or convergence to an l-replica, if an agent
holds il+ i′ units of money for some i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , B− 1} and i′ ∈ L, we say
that the agent has i “bundles” and i′ units of “change.”6
The following is our main result.
Proposition 1 Assume that s(l) = (λ∗, pi∗, w∗) is a steady-state that is an
l-replica of a pure-strategy Zhu steady state. If pi0 has a support that is
different from that of pi∗, then there is no equilibrium such that (λt, pit, wt)→
(λ∗, pi∗, w∗).7
That is, if the initial distribution has some holdings of change, then the
economy cannot converge to the l-replica steady state. Notice that our notion
of stability requires convergence of trades. This seems reasonable because
trades are what people do and what an outside observer would see. If the
economy’s distribution and value of money converge to those of s(l) and
agents’ actions converge, then we must have limw→w¯ p(i, j;w) ⊂ p(i, j; w¯).
For this reason, the description of optimal trades in l-replicas, including
those for meetings that occur with zero probability, is relevant.
The standard approach to stability analysis of difference equation sys-
tems (see, for example, [7]) is to compare the number of eigenvalues of the
dynamical system that are strictly smaller than one in absolute value, say
a, and the number of initial conditions, say b. If a = b (a > b), then there
is a unique (an infinity of) convergent path(s). If a < b, then there is no
convergent solution. Our analysis must go beyond those results for two rea-
sons. First, our dynamical system necessarily involves unit root convergence.
Second, the l-replica steady state is on the boundary of the state space in
two senses: pi∗ does not have full support and w∗ is not strictly increasing.
Both play important parts in our proof.
3 A simple example
We start with an example in which B = 1 (i.e., Trejos-Wright) and l = 2.
This example is simple because it is a pure-strategy steady state and because
6In what follows, non-prime letters (i, j, etc.) indicate numbers of bundles, and letters
with primes (i′, j′ ∈ L, etc.) indicate units of change.
7The fact that the Zhu steady state has a strictly concave value function is used only
in Lemma 1 and it can be dropped at the cost of complicating the proof. Because it is
not known whether a full-support steady state with a non-concave value function exists,
we do not present that extension here.
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the trades in the l = 2 replica are easy to describe. In addition, the aggre-
gate state of the l = 2 replica is one-dimensional and can be described by
the fraction of people with one unit of money. Despite its simplicity, it cap-
tures some of the main ingredients of our stability analysis. The proof is by
way of contradiction and shows that any convergent path violates either the
consumer’s optimality conditions (1) or monotonicity of the value function
(5).
Because s(2) ≡ (λ∗, pi∗, w∗) is identical to the Trejos-Wright steady state,
we have λ∗(2; 2, 0) = 1, (pi∗0, pi
∗
2) = (1−m,m), w∗0 = 0, and w∗2 is the unique
positive solution to (
N/β −N
1−m + 1
)
βw∗2 = u(βw
∗
2), (8)
where the positive solution exists if and only if the Trejos-Wright steady state
for B = 1 economy exists.
Also, (6) and (7) imply pi∗1 = 0 and w
∗
1 = 0. Given such w
∗
1 and w
∗
2, it
follows that λ∗(1; 1, 1) = 1 and λ∗(1; 2, 1) = 1.8
Assume pi01 > 0 and, by way of contradiction, that there exists an equilib-
rium (λt, pit, wt) that converges to an l-replica for l = 2, denoted (λ∗, pi∗, w∗).
We next show that λ∗(1; 1, 0) = 1. If the economy is close to (pi∗, w∗), then
(4) and pi01 > 0 imply w
0
1 > 0 because there is a positive probability that a
consumer with one unit meets a producer with one unit and the consumer
can get a positive amount of utility from such a meeting. Because equation
(8) implies u(x) > x for all x < βw∗2, we have u(βw
t
1) > βw
t
1. Therefore,
λt(1; 1, 0) = 1 is the only possibility for such a convergent equilibrium path.
We call such payment strategy described in Table 1 Payment Strategy 1.
Using pi0 + pi1 + pi2 = 1 and 0pi0 + 1pi1 + 2pi2 = 2m, the money-holding
distribution can be characterized by pit1 only:
(pit0, pi
t
1, pi
t
2) =
(
1−m− pi
t
1
2
, pit1, m−
pit1
2
)
. (9)
Let pit1 ∈ [0, 2min(m, 1−m)] to ensure pit0, pit2 ∈ [0, 1]. Under Payment Strat-
egy 1, the law of motion is
pit+11 = Ψ(pi
t
1) ≡ pit1 −
2(pit1)
2
N
. (10)
8One can show that the step function form (7) of the value function in our definition
of l-replicas is in fact necessary in this example.
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Table 1: Payment Strategy 1
Seller’s money holding
0 1 2
Buyer’s 0 - - -
money 1 1 unit 1 unit -
holdings 2 2 units 1 unit -
Figure ?? shows the law of motion. The law of motion is locally stable at
pi∗1 = 0, but it exhibits unit root convergence: the slope at the fixed point
is one. This happens because there are no net inflows into holdings of one
unit and there are net outflows, but only from (1, 1)-meetings. The unit root
arises because as pit1 goes to zero, the frequency of (1, 1)-meetings, which is
equal to (pit1)
2/N , goes to zero much faster.
Under Payment Strategy 1, the Bellman equation is
wt1 =
N−1+pit2
N
βwt+11 +
pit0
N
u(βwt+11 ) +
pit1
N
u(βwt+12 − βwt+11 )
wt2 =
N−1+pit2
N
βwt+12 +
pit0
N
u(βwt+12 ) +
pit1
N
[u(βwt+12 − βwt+11 ) + βwt+11 ]
.
(11)
The Jacobian of the r.h.s. of (11) with respect to wt+1 = (wt+11 , w
t+1
2 ) evalu-
ated at the l = 2 replica is [
λ¯ 0
0 λ
]
, (12)
where
λ¯ ≡ pi
∗
0
N
u′(0)β +
N − 1 + pi∗2
N
β > 1 (13)
λ ≡ pi
∗
0
N
u′(βw∗2)β +
N − 1 + pi∗2
N
β ∈ (0, 1). (14)
If (8) has a positive solution, then (13) and (14) hold. Because the matrix
(12) has an inverse and because we can extend the domain of u to include an
open neighborhood around 0, the implicit function theorem can be applied
to (11) to get
wt+1 = Φ(pit, wt), (15)
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which we refer to as the forward-looking Bellman equation and which is valid
in the neighborhood of an l = 2 replica.
Equations (10) and (15) form our dynamical system. The Jacobian matrix
of the joint system evaluated at the l = 2 replica is
[
Ψpi O
Φpi Φw
]
=
 1 0 0−γ/λ¯ 1/λ¯ 0
−δ/(2λ) 0 1/λ
 , (16)
where
γ ≡ 1
N
u(βw∗2) > 0 (17)
δ ≡ 1
N
[u(βw∗2)− βw∗2] > 0, (18)
and where the last inequality follows from (8).
Since, initially, pi01 6= 0 and the law of motion has unit root convergence,
the convergence trajectory will eventually be parallel to the eigenspace of
(16) associated with the unit eigenvalue9. The associated eigenvector, which
constitutes a base of the space, has the form 1−γ
λ¯−1
∗
 ,
where ∗ is a number irrelevant to our argument. Note that −γ/(λ¯− 1) < 0.
Since the first variable of the linearized system, pit1−pi∗1, is always positive in
the process of convergence, the second variable, wt1 − w∗1 (and therefore wt1)
will eventually become negative, which violates (5). We conclude that there
is no convergent equilibrium path.
We have established a non-existence result for some class of dynamic
equilibria. Here we will try to give some intuitive explanation for this non-
existence. Why is it impossible that people follow Payment Strategy 1,
believing that (wt1, w
t
2) will keep positive value but eventually converge to
(0, w∗2)? In that case, convergence of w
t
1 to zero should be exponential and
cannot be a unit-root convergence; for a fiat money to ever have positive
value, u′(0) cannot be too small, which implies high marginal utility of very
9See Subsection “dominant eigenvector” on page 165 of [6].
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little consumption and necessitates quick convergence of wt1 to zero
10. On the
other hand, pit1 goes to zero extremely slowly, resembling a positive constant
in the end. These two facts are not consistent with each other because if
there is non-negligible chance of meeting a producer with one unit of money,
the value of holding one unit of money is not negligible either.
Given that such equilibrium paths do not exist, people should not believe
them. They should believe something else, for example, converging to a non-
monetary steady state or to a full-support steady state. In the latter case,
following Payment Strategy 1 would no longer be optimal.11
4 Proof for the general case
The argument for the B = 1, l = 2 example uses knowledge of the trades in
the pure-strategy Zhu steady state. In the general case, we know very little
about those trades. Nevertheless, as we now show, a proof can be constructed
using similar ideas. The proof is by way of contradiction so we suppose that
there exists a sequence {λt, pit, wt} that converges to an l-replica steady state
and examine the implications of the resulting dynamical system. The proof
relies on five lemmas.12
The first lemma describes features of optimal trades in s(l), including
features of trades in some of the zero-probability meetings.
Lemma 1 Suppose that s = (λˆ, pˆi, wˆ) is a pure-strategy Zhu steady state and
let pˆ(i, j) be the unique solution of (1). Then the trade of s(l) satisfies the
following: in (il + i′, jl + j′)-meetings,
(i) if i′+ j′ < l, then after the meeting, consumer has i− pˆ(i, j) bundles and
producer has j + pˆ(i, j) bundles; and
(ii) if i′+j′ ≥ l, then after the meeting, consumer has i+1−max(1, pˆ(i+1, j))
bundles and producer has j +max(1, pˆ(i+ 1, j)) bundles.
Although change has zero value at s(l), when the sum of change in a
meeting exceeds l (case (ii)), the producer can form an extra bundle by re-
ceiving enough change from the consumer. Therefore, when the total amount
10This reason is similar to why the convergence to a non-monetary steady state is quick
for some models of fiat money (e.g., Diamond’s OLG model of money, or the Trejos-Wright
model).
11For the two-unit bound case, [4] shows that full-support steady states always exist
and is almost always locally stable.
12The proofs of the lemmas are in the Appendix.
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of change in a single-coincidence meeting exceeds l, the consumer behaves as
if he had an extra bundle.
Before proceeding to the other lemmas, it is helpful to rearrange com-
ponents in the λt, pit and wt vectors. First, we let λt include only trades
of meetings in which either consumer or producer has positive amount of
change. If neither has change, then the consumer pays pˆ(i, j)l with proba-
bility one, so there is no randomization. Note also that one element of each
λt(·; il + i′, jl + j′) is eliminated using (2).
Next, we eliminate pit0 and pi
t
Bl in pi
t using the following adding-up condi-
tions:
Bl∑
i=0
piti = 1, and
Bl∑
i=0
ipiti = lm. (19)
Then the remaining components of pit are divided into l groups, where each
group consists of pii’s that have the same amount of change. That is, we
now let the state be described by (pitN , pi
t
F ), where pi
t
N ≡ (pit(i′))i′∈L with
pit(i′) ≡ (pitil+i′)i∈B\B, and pitF ≡ (pitil)i∈B\{0,B}. As regards wt, we use the
incremental value of change, wtil+i′ − wtil and group them into l − 1 groups
according to the amount of change. Let ∆wt ≡ (∆wti′)i′∈L, where ∆wti′ ≡
(wtil+i′ − wtil)i∈B\{B} and let wtF = (wtil)i∈B. Notice that wt can be recovered
from (∆wt, wtF ). The one-to-one transformation of variables from (pi
t, wt) to
(pitN ,∆w
t, pitF , w
t
F ) turns out to be useful because, as will be shown in Lemmas
2 and 3, the Jacobians of law of motion and Bellman equation come to have
tractable triangular forms. In addition, the linearized system for (pitN ,∆w
t)
does not depend upon the other two variables. In other words, these two
variables are locally autonomous.
We express the law of motion and the Bellman equation in terms of the
transformed variables as
(pit+1N , pi
t+1
F ) = Ψ(pi
t
N , pi
t
F , λ
t) (20)
and
(∆wt, wtF ) = φ(pi
t
N ,∆w
t+1, pitF , w
t+1
F , λ
t) (21)
We let Ψ and φ with superscripts refer to each component of the mappings
and those with subscripts refer to derivatives with respect to that subscript
variable. For example φ∆w indicates the subvector that defines ∆wt.
The next lemma describes properties of the Jacobian of Ψ, the most
important of which concerns the existence of unit eigenvalues.
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Lemma 2 (i) The Jacobian of Ψ with respect to pi evaluated at (λ∗, pi∗) has
the following triangular form:
Ψpi =
[
ΨpiNpiN O
ΨpiFpiN Ψ
piF
piF
]
with ΨpiNpiN =
Ψ
pi(1)
pi(1) · · · Ψpi(1)pi(l−1)
O
. . .
...
O O Ψ
pi(l−1)
pi(l−1)
 , (22)
where Ψ
pi(k′)
pi(v′) =
(
∂pit+1
kl+k′
∂pit
vl+v′
)
k,v=0,1,··· ,B−1
.
(ii) ΨpiNpiN has at least one unit eigenvalue.
(iii) If ΨpiNpiN has a positive eigenvalue that is strictly smaller than one,
then the associated eigenvector has both strictly positive and strictly negative
elements.
(iv) Ψλ = 0.
The proof of the above lemma involves studying the derivative of Ψ. Part
(i) derives the Jacobian by straightfoward differentiation. Parts (ii) and (iii)
show that the convergence of pitN to zero necessarily involves a unit-root. The
intuition is analogous to that of the {0, 1, 2} case; In order for the measure
of people holding positive change to go to zero, it is necessary for them to be
matched with others with change. However, as the measure of people with
change goes to zero, the frequency of such meetings goes to zero much faster.
Part (iv) is also a straightforward differentiation and shows that the small
change in λt does not affect pitN near the l-replica.
We now investigate the Jacobians of φ, equation (21).
Lemma 3 (i) The linear approximation of φ∆w around the l-replica has the
form
∆wt = φ∆w∆w∆w
t+1 + φ∆wpiN pi
t
N . (23)
That is, it does not depend on pitF , w
t+1
F , or λ
t.
(ii) The Jacobian φ∆wpiN consists of (l−1)×(l−1) blocks and has a lower-right
triangular form:
φ∆wpiN =

O · · · O K
... upslope upslope ...
O upslope ...
K · · · · · · K
 , (24)
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where K is a B by B matrix that only has strictly positive elements.
(iii) The Jacobian φ∆w∆w has a lower-left triangular form:
φ∆w∆w =

φ∆w1∆w1 O · · · O
...
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . O
φ
∆wl−1
∆w1
· · · · · · φ∆wl−1∆wl−1
 , (25)
where each diagonal block φ
∆wi′
∆wi′
is a B by B matrix that only has nonnegative
elements.
For the purpose of deriving the Jacobian of (21), we do not need the
explicit form of (21); because the change of variables from wt to (∆wt, wtF ) is a
linear transformation, we can first linearize the original Bellman equation and
then do the variable transformation. That way, we get the linear expansion
of (21) or, equivalently, the Jacobian of (21), which has several properties as
the lemma summarizes.
We are now ready to obtain a stacked system and study its Jacobian. We
apply the implicit function theorem to solve for (∆wt+1, wt+1F ) as a function
of (λt, pit, wt) from Bellman equation (21) around the l-replica and refer to it
as the forward-looking Bellman equation, denoted by Φ. Then we stack the
law of motion and the forward-looking Bellman equation:
(pit+1N , pi
t+1
F ) = Ψ(pi
t
N , pi
t
F , λ
t) (26)
(∆wt+1, wt+1F ) = Φ(pi
t
N ,∆w
t, pitF , w
t
F , λ
t). (27)
The next lemma shows that (pitN ,∆w
t) does not depend on the other variables
in the linearized system (that is, (pitN ,∆w
t) is locally autonomous) and gives
the Jacobian of the linear system of (pitN ,∆w
t).
Lemma 4 In the linearized system of (26)-(27), (pit+1N ,∆w
t+1) depends only
upon (pitN ,∆w
t) and does not depend on (pitF , w
t
F , λ
t). The Jacobian of the
linearized system for (pitN ,∆w
t) is given by
A ,
[
ΨpiNpiN O−[φ∆w∆w]−1φ∆wpiN [φ∆w∆w]−1
]
. (28)
Moreover, A has a unit eigenvalue.
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The proof uses Lemmas 2 and 3.
Matrix A represents the linearized system of (pitN ,∆w
t). It turns out
that a unit eigenvalue(s) of A dictates the dynamics of (pitN ,∆w
t). The
following lemma characterizes associated eigenvectors. Such an eigenvector
is relevant to our analysis because it represents the trajectory of convergence
of (pitN ,∆w
t) to zero.
Lemma 5 Denote an eigenvector of ΨpiNpiN associated with a unit eigenvalue
by z = (z1, · · · , zl−1) ≥ 0, where each zi′ is a B-dimensional column vector.
Let ϕ∆wi′ , (I − φ
∆wi′
∆wi′
)−1Kzl−i′, with i′ ∈ L.
(i) The eigenvector of matrix A associated with a unit eigenvalue has the
form (z,$1, · · · , $l−1), with $1...
$l−1
 =

0
...
0
ϕ∆wl−1
+

0
...
ϕ∆wl−2
∗
+ · · ·+

ϕ∆w1
∗
...
∗
 . (29)
(ii) If zl−i′ ≥ 0, zl−i′ 6= 0 and ϕ∆wi′ ≥ 0, then ϕ∆wi′ > 0.
(iii) If zl−i′ ≥ 0, zl−i′ 6= 0 and λ∗(i′; i′, 0) = 1, then ϕ∆wi′has strictly negative
elements.
The proof is matrix algebra in which the lower triangular form of (29) is
from the triangular forms of (24) and (25). Part (ii) is from the fact that K
is a strictly positive matrix and implies that holding i′ units of change can
have positive value if positive measure of people have l − i′ units of change.
Part (iii) provides a sufficient condition under which the value of i′ units of
change has strictly negative elements. This will lead to a contradiction in
the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists
an equilibrium path (λt, pit, wt) convergent to an l-replica of a pure-strategy
Zhu steady state, (λ∗, pi∗, w∗). By assumption, the initial distribution has a
different support from pi∗ so that pi0N 6= 0. Then, (4) implies ∆w0 6= 0 because
some agents with positive amount of change at the initial date has chance to
meet a producer with change and get extra amount of goods by transfering
their change. Note also that because (pi∗N ,∆w
∗) = (0, 0), it should be the
case that (pitN − pi∗N ,∆wt −∆w∗) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0.
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The sequence must satisfy (3), (4) and, if randomization occurs, the in-
difference across solutions (1). By Lemma 4, sufficiently near the steady
state, (pitN ,∆w
t) forms a locally autonomous system (i.e., does not depend
on other variables) and the linear system is represented by the Jacobian (28).
In what follows we show that the dominant eigenvalue that characterizes the
convergence of (pitN ,∆w
t) is a unit eigenvalue and not an eigenvalue that is
smaller than one.
Suppose by way of contradiction that the dominant eigenvalue is strictly
smaller than one. It is enough to consider the evolution of pitN in this case.
By Lemma 2 (iii), the associated eigenvector of ΨpiNpiN has strictly negative
elements. The dominant mode argument (see [6]) implies that pitN eventually
becomes parallel to the associated eigenvector. It follows that some elements
in pitN will become strictly negative, contradicting pi
t
N ≥ 0.
Therefore the law of motion involves unit-root convergence, so does the
dynamics of (pitN ,∆w
t). The dominant mode argument implies that (pitN ,∆w
t)
eventually becomes parallel to an eigenspace, vectors of which have the form
of (z,$1, · · · , $l−1) in Lemma 5. It follows that (z,$1, · · · , $l−1) is non-
negative because (pitN −pi∗N ,∆wt−∆w∗) is nonnegative along the convergent
path. Let h′ = max{i′|zi′ 6= 0}. By Lemma 5(i), we have $1...
$l−1
 =

0
...
0
ϕ∆wl−1
+ · · ·+

0
...
ϕ∆wl−h′
∗
 . (30)
In the following, let wx+p − wx ≡ ∆w(x, p).
Case 1: Suppose h′ < l − 1. Equation (30) implies 0 ≤ $l−h′ = ϕ∆wl−h′
and $l−i′ = 0 for i′ > h′. By Lemma 5(ii), ϕ∆wl−h′ ≥ 0 implies ϕ∆wl−h′ > 0
and hence $l−h′ > 0. With the dominant mode argument, ∆wt becomes
parallel to (0, · · · , 0, $l−h′ , · · · , $l−1). In other words, the value of less than
l − h′ units of change will become negligible compared with the values of
l − h′ units of change. Furthermore, the fact that ∆wt(0, l − h′) is strictly
positive and converges to zero implies u′(0)β∆wt(0, l−h′) > β∆wt(0, l−h′).
(That is, u(βwtl−h′−βwt0) > βwtl−h′ once wtl−h′ gets sufficiently close to zero.)
Hence, the value of trading all the change dominates the value of no-trade in
(l−h′, 0)-meetings. Therefore, we have λ∗(l−h′; l−h′, 0) = 1. Lemma 5(iii)
implies that ϕ∆wl−h′ has negative elements, a contradiction to ϕ∆wl−h′ ≥ 0.
Case 2: Suppose h′ = l − 1. Arguments similar to those of case 1 lead to
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λ∗(1; 1, 0) = 1. Lemma 5(iii) implies that ϕ∆w1 has negative elements, which
contradicts to ϕ∆w1 ≥ 0.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper shows instability of the non-full-support steady states that are
l-replicas of pure-strategy Zhu (2003) full-support steady states. A possible
extension is to consider the case where the Zhu full-support steady state is
a mixed-strategy steady state. In order to do that, bundle-trading strategies
in (vl + v′, jl)-meetings would have to be allowed to vary with v′ ∈ L. A
consequence is that the linearized Bellman equation for ∆wt in Lemma 3
would depend on wF . In such a case, a different proof is needed.
A natural question is whether our instability result holds under alterna-
tive assumptions. For example, does it hold if money is divisible? Does it
hold in a version with lotteries?
Another relevant issue is stability of steady states more generally. Lomeli
and Temzelides [5] show in the B = 1 case that the non-monetary steady
state is stable and indeterminate. In a companion paper [4], we provide
a stability analysis of full-support monetary steady states for the B = 2
case. We show that the full-support steady states in the {0, 1, 2} economy
are locally stable, whether they are pure-strategy or mixed-strategy steady
states. Apart from that, there is no stability analysis for full-support steady
states for B > 1.
There is very little work on stability of steady states in matching models
of money. An exception is Green and Zhou (2002), who also study a dynamic
equilibrium in a matching model of fiat money. However, the value of money
in their stationary equilibrium is linear so that ‘change’ in their stationary
equibrium is not worthless as it is in an l-replica of a Zhu steady state. Also,
the models are very different.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The optimality of the bundle trading specified in
(i) is obvious and proof is omitted. For the optimality of (ii), note first that
under i′ + j′ ≥ l, the consumer pays at least l − j′(≤ i′) units in order for
the producer to form one bundle and produce a positive amount of goods.
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Suppose that the consumer pays another s bundles and s′ units of change to
the producer such that (s, s′) solves the following.
max
s∈{0,1,··· ,min(i,B−j−1)}
s′∈{0,··· ,i′+j′−l}
(j+1)l+sl+s′≤Bl
u[β(w∗(j+1)l+sl+s′ − w∗jl+j′)] + βw∗il+i′−(l−j′)−(sl+s′)
= max
s+1∈{1,··· ,min(i+1,B−j)}
u[β(w∗jl+(s+1)l − w∗jl)] + βw∗((i+1)−(s+1))l, (31)
where the equality follows from the step-function form (7). If pˆ(i + 1, j) is
not equal to zero, then s+ 1 is equal to pˆ(i+ 1, j).
If pˆ(i + 1, j) = 0, then s + 1 = 0 is not possible. In this case, we will
consider any second best solution. Given that the objective function in (31) is
concave in s, s = 0 will achieve the optimum in (31). Overall, the consumer’s
post-trade bundle holding is i + 1 − max(1, pˆ(i + 1, j)) and the producer’s
post-trade bundle holding is j +max(1, pˆ(i+ 1, j)).
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we rewrite the law of motion (3) in terms of
“change” and “bundles” as follows:
pit+1kl+k′ = pi
t
kl+k′
+
1
N
∑
i′,i,j′,j,il+i′>kl+k′
pitil+i′pi
t
jl+j′λ
t(il + i′ − kl − k′; il + i′, jl + j′)
+
1
N
∑
i′,i,j′,j,jl+j′<kl+k′
pitil+i′pi
t
jl+j′λ
t(kl + k′ − jl − j′; il + i′, jl + j′)
− 1
N
∑
j′,j
pitkl+k′pi
t
jl+j′
∑
p>0
λt(p; vl + v′, jl)
− 1
N
∑
i′,i
pitil+i′pi
t
kl+k′
∑
p>0
λt(p; il, vl + v′), (32)
where pit0 and pi
t
Bl are given by two adding-up conditions (19). The conclusion
is reached by differentiating this law of motion and evaluating the result at pi∗.
Because most of the terms in the law of motion are quadratic and pi∗il+i′ = 0
for i′ > 0, after differentiating and evaluating them at pi∗, many of the terms
will disappear. Throughout this paper, the derivatives are evaluated at the
steady state. We suppress such dependence to simplify the notations. One
17
can show that for (v′, v) 6= (k′, k) and v′, k′ ∈ L,
∂pit+1kl+k′
∂pitvl+v′
=
1
N
B∑
j=0
pi∗jlλ
∗(vl + v′ − kl − k′; vl + v′, jl)
+
1
N
B∑
i=0
pi∗ilλ
∗(il − kl − k′; il, vl + v′)
+
1
N
B∑
j=0
pi∗jlλ
∗(kl + k′ − jl; vl + v′, jl)
+
1
N
B∑
i=0
pi∗ilλ
∗(kl + k′ − vl − v′; il, vl + v′)
≥ 0, (33)
and
∂pit+1kl+k′
∂pitkl+k′
= 1− 1
N
B∑
i=0
pi∗il
∑
p>0,p6=il−kl−k′
λ∗(p; il, kl + k′)
− 1
N
B∑
j=0
pi∗jl
∑
p>0,p6=kl+k′−jl
λ∗(p; kl + k′, jl) ≥ 0. (34)
Consider the case where k′ > v′. Note that all the terms in (33) are associated
with meetings where the total amount of change is v′. By Lemma 1, nobody
ends up with k′ units of change after such meetings. Thus, all the terms are
zero, and hence Ψpi in (22) has a block-triangular form.
To prove (ii) and (iii), we first establish several claims:
Claim 1 If k′ < v′, then Ψpi(k
′)
pi(v′) ≥ 0. Moreover, the equality for the (k, v)
element holds if and only if for all i ∈ B, meetings between il and vl + v′
leave no one with kl + k′ units of money with probability one.
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Claim 2 Each diagonal block is positive. Moreover, in the vth column of
Ψ
pi(v′)
pi(v′), the sum of elements is no greater than one, and it is equal to one if
and only if for all i ∈ B, meetings between il and vl+ v′ leave one agent with
v′ units of change with probability one.
Claim 3 The vth column of Ψ
pi(k′)
pi(v′) for all k
′ = 1, · · · , v′ − 1 is equal to zero
if and only if in the vth column of Ψ
pi(v′)
pi(v′), the sum of elements is equal to one.
Claim 1 is exactly what equation (33) states. The first part of Claim 2
follows from the inequalities in (33) and (34). The second part is shown as
follows:
[The sum of the vth column of Ψ
pi(v′)
pi(v′)]
=
∂pit+1vl+v′
∂pitvl+v′
+
B−1∑
k=0,k 6=v
∂pit+1kl+v′
∂pitvl+v′
= 1− 1
N
B∑
i=0
pi∗il
∑
p>0,p6=il−vl−v′
λ∗(p; il, vl + v′)
+
1
N
B∑
i=0
pi∗il
B−1∑
k=0,k 6=v
λ∗(il − kl − v′; il, vl + v′)
+
1
N
B∑
i=0
pi∗il
B−1∑
k=0,k 6=v
λ∗(kl − vl; il, vl + v′)
− 1
N
B∑
j=0
pi∗jl
∑
p>0,p6=vl+v′−jl
λ∗(p; vl + v′, jl)
+
1
N
B∑
j=0
pi∗jl
B−1∑
k=0,k 6=v
λ∗(vl − kl; vl + v′, jl)
+
1
N
B∑
j=0
pi∗jl
B−1∑
k=0,k 6=v
λ∗(kl + v′ − jl; vl + v′, jl)
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= 1 − 1
N
B∑
i=0
pi∗il
∑
p>0,p6=il−kl−v′ or (k−v)l for k∈B
λ∗(p; il, vl + v′)
− 1
N
B∑
j=0
pi∗jl
∑
p>0,p6=kl+v′−jl or (v−k)l for k∈B
λ∗(p; vl + v′, jl) .
Note that
∑
p>0,p6=il−kl−v′ or (k−v)l for k∈B λ
∗(p; il, vl + v′) = 0 is equivalent to
the fact that the meeting (il, vl + v′) leaves no one with v′ units of change
with probability one. A similar statement holds for the second term in the
above. Therefore we have Claim 2. Combining Claims 1 and 2 leads to Claim
3.
(ii) In the following discussion, we denote the transpose of a vector by
superscript T . For any x ∈ N, we let 1x = (1, · · · , 1)T and 0x = (0, · · · , 0)T ,
both of which are x-dimensional. Because Ψpipi is an upper-triangular block
matrix, the eigenvalues of Ψpipi are those of Ψ
pi(v′)
pi(v′), with v
′ ∈ L. Consider Ψpi(1)pi(1),
the block corresponding to one-unit change. Claim 2 implies that in each
column of Ψ
pi(1)
pi(1), the sum of elements is equal to one: 1
T
BΨ
pi(1)
pi(1) = 1
T
B = 1 · 1TB.
Hence, Ψ
pi(1)
pi(1) has a unit eigenvalue, and therefore, Ψ
pi
pi has a unit eigenvalue.
(iii) Suppose by way of contradiction that Ψpipi has an eigenvalue that is
smaller than one, say τ ∈ (0, 1), and that its associated eigenvector has only
non-negative elements such that the law of motion could have exponential
convergence to pi∗ along this eigenvector. Denote that eigenvector by η =
(ηT1 , · · · , ηTl−1)T ≥ 0, where for each v′ ∈ L, ηv′ is a B-dimensional vector.
We have B(l − 1) equations:
0B(l−1) = (Ψpipi − τI) η.
Sum up the first B equations, the second B equations, etc.
0l−1 =

1TBΨ
pi(1)
pi(1) − 1TBτ 1TBΨΠ(1)Π(2) · · · 1TBΨpi(1)pi(l−1)
0TB 1
T
BΨ
pi(2)
pi(2) − 1TBτ · · ·
0TB 0
T
B
. . .
...
...
...
. . . 1TBΨ
pi(l−2)
pi(l−1)
0TB 0
T
B · · · 1TBΨpi(l−1)pi(l−1) − 1TBτ


η1
...
...
ηl−1

(35)
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By Claim 1, we have 1TBΨ
Π(k′)
Π(v′) ≥ 0 for k′ < v′ and thus the upper right
blocks of the first matrix of the above equation are positive matrices. More-
over, the previous argument implies that 1TBΨ
pi(1)
pi(1) − τ1TB = 1TB − τ1TB =
(1− τ)1TB > 0. Therefore, we have η1 = 0.
We use mathematical induction and assume that η1 = · · · = ηv′−1 = 0. In
what follows, we want to show ηv′ = 0. The following discussion is divided
into two cases.
Case 1: Consider any v ∈ B\B such that ∑B−1k=0 ∂pit+1kl+v′∂pit
vl+v′
6= 1. Then by
Claim 3, there exists k′ smaller than v
′
such that the vth column of Ψ
Π(k′)
Π(v′),
which corresponds to the (k′, v′) block in the first matrix of (35), has strictly
positive elements. The sum of elements in this column
∑B−1
k=0
∂pit+1
kl+k′
∂pit
vl+v′
is strictly
greater than 0. If we look into the k′th row in the r.h.s. of (35), given that
η1 = · · · = ηv′−1 = 0, the resulting vector is equal to
∑l−1
r′=v′ 1
T
BΨ
Π(k′)
Π(r′)ηr′ . It
satisfies the following condition:
0 =
l−1∑
r′=v′
1TBΨ
Π(k′)
Π(r′)ηr′ ≥ 1TBΨΠ(k
′)
Π(v′)ηv′ ≥
B−1∑
k=0
∂pit+1kl+k′
∂pitvl+v′
ηv′(v) ≥ 0, (36)
where ηv′(v) is the vth element of vector ηv′ . The equality is by (35). The
first inequality is because 1TBΨ
Π(k′)
Π(r′)ηr′ ≥ 0 for all r′ ≥ v
′
. If we write out
the matrix multiplication in 1TBΨ
Π(k′)
Π(v′)ηv′ , (33), (34) and ηv′ ≥ 0 imply the
second inequality. Since
∑B−1
k=0
∂pit+1
kl+k′
∂pit
vl+v′
is strictly greater than 0, we must
have ηv′(v) = 0.
Case 2: Consider any v ∈ B\B such that∑B−1k=0 ∂pit+1kl+v′∂pit
vl+v′
= 1. If we look into
the v′th row in the r.h.s. of (35), the resulting vector is equal to (1TBΨ
Π(v′)
Π(v′)−
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τ1TB)ηv′ +
∑l
r′=v′+1 1
T
BΨ
Π(v′)
Π(r′)ηr′ . It satisfies
0 = (1TBΨ
Π(v′)
Π(v′) − τ1TB)ηv′ +
l−1∑
r′=v′+1
1TBΨ
Π(v′)
Π(r′)ηr′
≥ (1TBΨΠ(v
′)
Π(v′) − τ1TB)ηv′
≥ (
B−1∑
k=0
∂pit+1kl+v′
∂pitvl+v′
− τ)ηv′(v)
≥ 0. (37)
The equality is by (35). The first inequality is because 1TBΨ
Π(v′)
Π(r′)ηr′ ≥ 0
for all r′ > v
′
. If we write out the matrix multiplication in (1TBΨ
Π(v′)
Π(v′) −
τ1TB)ηv′ , we have the sum over (
∑B−1
k=0
∂pit+1
kl+v′
∂pit
vl+v′
− τ)ηv′(v) for all v ∈ B\B.
For those v ∈ B\B such that ∑B−1k=0 ∂pit+1kl+v′∂pit
vl+v′
6= 1, we have ηv′(v) = 0 by
Case 1, and therefore (
∑B−1
k=0
∂pit+1
kl+v′
∂pit
vl+v′
− τ)ηv′(v) = 0 for such v. For those
v ∈ B\B such that ∑B−1k=0 ∂pit+1kl+v′∂pit
vl+v′
= 1, we have (
∑B−1
k=0
∂pit+1
kl+v′
∂pit
vl+v′
− τ)ηv′(v) ≥ 0.
Combining these results for the two types of v gives the second inequality.
Since
∑B−1
k=0
∂pit+1
kl+v′
∂pit
vl+v′
− τ is strictly greater than 0, (37) implies ηv′(v) = 0.
Combining these two cases, we have ηv′ = 0.
(iv) Because coefficient of λt(p; il + i′, jl + j′) for i′ + j′ > 0 in (3) is
± 1
N
piil+i′pijl+j′ , it is equal to zero at the l-replica. Thus we have Ψλ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Let wx+p − wx ≡ ∆w(x, p). The original Bellman
equation can be written as
wtil+i′ =∑
j∈B\{B},j′∈L∪{0}
pitjl+j′
N
∑
p
λt(p; il + i′, jl + j′)u(β∆wt+1(jl + j′, p))
+
∑
j∈B\{B},j′∈L∪{0}
pitjl+j′
N
β
∑
p
λt(p; il + i′, jl + j′)wt+1il+i′−p +
N − 1 + pitBl
N
βwt+1il+i′ .
(38)
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Recalling Lemma 1, we take the linear expansion of equation (38) at the
steady state and then subtract wtil from w
t
il+i′ for i
′ ∈ L to get the linear
expansion of φ∆w in (21):
wtil+i′ − wtil
=
∑
j∈B\B
p∈pˆ(i,j)
v′∈{0,··· ,i′}
pi∗jl
N
u′(β∆w∗(jl, pl))βλ∗(pl + v′; il + i′, jl)∆wt+1(jl + pl, v′)
+
∑
j∈B\B
p∈pˆ(i,j)
v′∈{0,··· ,i′}
pi∗jl
N
βλ∗(pl + v′; il + i′, jl)∆wt+1(jl − pl, i′ − v′)
+
pi∗Bl +N − 1
N
β(wt+1il+i′ − wt+1il )
+
∑
jl+j′ 6∈{0,Bl}
κ(il+i′,jl+j′)(pi
t
jl+j′ − pi∗jl+j′), (39)
where
κ(il+i′,jl+j′) ≡ 1
N
{
∑
p
λ∗(p; il + i′, jl + j′)
[
u(β∆w∗(jl + j′, p)) + βw∗il+i′−p
]
−
∑
p
λ∗(p; il, jl + j′)
[
u(β∆w∗(jl + j′, p)) + βw∗il−p
]}.
By Lemma 1, κ(il+i′,jl+j′) = 0 if j
′ = 0. Thus, the r.h.s. of (39) does not
depend on pitF . Lemma 1 implies the same pure strategy in trading bundles
across meetings (il + i′, jl) for different change holding i′. Thus, the r.h.s.
depends on wt+1 only throught incremental values ∆wt+1. Finally, note that
because all trades in the support of randomization gives the same payoff,
changing randomization has no impact on the current value. Therefore we
have φλ = 0.
(ii) Looking into the coefficients with respect to pitN in (39) gives φ
∆w
piN
. Because
of (7) and Lemma 1, two facts follow: (I) κ(il+i′,jl+j′) = 0 for all i
′, j′ such
that i′ + j′ < l, and (II) as long as both i′ + j′ and i′′ + j′′ are greater than
l, κ(il+i′,jl+j′) = κ(i′′+il,j′′+jl). Therefore, it is valid to let Ki,j be equal to
κ(il+i′,jl+j′) for i
′ + j′ ≥ l, and we have the statement.
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The strict positiveness of Ki,j is due to the following. The first term of
Ki,j is the consumer’s payoff in the meeting (il + i
′, jl + j′), and the second
term is that in the meeting (il, jl+j′). Because i′+j′ ≥ l, l−j′ units of money
have the same value as a bundle to the producer. The consumer gets a higher
payoff from giving that much change than she does in the meeting (il, jl+j′).
(iii) Looking into the coefficients with respect to the incremental values of
change gives φ∆w∆w. Because the total amount of change in a meeting cannot
increase after trade, we have
d(wtil+i′ − wtil)
d(wt+1vl+v′ − wt+1vl )
= 0
if i′ < v′. Hence, all the blocks to the right of the diagonal are zero. For the
diagonal blocks, we have(
φ
∆wi′
∆wi′
)
i+1,v+1
=
d(wtil+i′ − wtil)
d(wt+1vl+i′ − wt+1vl )
=
∑
j∈B\B
pi∗jl
N
u′(β∆w∗(jl, vl − jl))βλ∗(vl + i′ − jl; il + i′, jl)
+
∑
j∈B\B
pi∗jl
N
βλ∗(il − vl; il + i′, jl)
+
pi∗Bl +N − 1
N
β1{i = v} (40)
≥ 0,
where the terms in the summation correspond to inflows into vl+i′ generated
by meetings (il + i′, jl) for j ∈ B\B.
Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemmas 2(i)(iv) and 3(i), the stacked system
(26)-(27) when linearized does not depend on λt, and its Jacobian has the
following form: 
ΨpiNpiN O O O−[φ∆w∆w]−1φ∆wpiN [φ∆w∆w]−1 O O
ΨpiFpiN O Ψ
piF
piF
O
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
 , (41)
where the ∗s are blocks irrelevant to our analysis. This implies that (pitN ,∆wt)
does not depend on other variables locally and their linear system is repre-
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sented by (28). Finally, since the upper-right block of A is a zero matrix, the
eigenvalues of A are those of ΨpiNpiN and [φ
∆w
∆w]
−1. By Lemma 2(ii), ΨpiNpiN has a
unit eigenvalue.
Proof of Lemma 5. (i) Suppose η = (z, η2) is the eigenvector of A
associated with a unit eigenvalue of ΨpiNpiN :[
ΨpiNpiN 0−[φ∆w∆w]−1φ∆wpiN [φ∆w∆w]−1
] [
z
η2
]
=
[
z
η2
]
.
Hence, we have −[φ∆w∆w]−1φ∆wpiN z + [φ∆w∆w]−1η2 = η2. Note that the inverse of
the lower-triangular matrix is a lower-triangular matrix. Therefore, we have
η2 = (I−φ∆w∆w)−1φ∆wpiN z =

0
...
0
(I − φ∆wl−1∆wl−1)−1Kz1
+· · ·+

(I − φ∆w1∆w1)−1Kzl−1∗
...
∗
 .
(ii) Assume by way of contradiction that (ϕ∆wi′ )i = 0 for some i. By the
definition of ϕ, We have
(I − φ∆wi′∆wi′ )ϕ∆wi′ = Kzl−i′ , (42)
where the r.h.s. is strictly positive because of zl−i′ ≥ 0 and Lemma 3 (ii). The
i-th element of the l.h.s. of (42) is −∑v 6=i (φ∆wi′∆wi′)i,v (ϕ∆wi′ )v which cannot
be strictly positive because
(
φ
∆wi′
∆wi′
)
i,v
is non-negative for v 6= i (Lemma 3
(iii)).
(iii) Suppose by contradiction ϕ∆wi′ ≥ 0. (ii) implies ϕ∆wi′ > 0. By
letting i = 0 and λ∗(i′; i′, 0) = 1 in (40), it can be shown that the first
element of (I − φ∆wi′∆wi′ )ϕ∆wi′ is[
1− β
(
pi∗Bl +N − 1 + pi∗0u′(0)
N
)]
(ϕ∆wi′ )1−
B−1∑
v=1
(
φ
∆wi′
∆wi′
)
i+1,v+1
(ϕ∆wi′ )v+1 < 0,
(43)
since u′(0) is assumed to be any large number.(u′(0) > [N/β − N + (1 −
pi∗Bl)]/pi
∗
0 is sufficient here. This condition resembles (13) in the example
section.) However, the strict inequality (43) contradicts the fact that the
r.h.s. of (42) is strictly positive.
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